In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI/IOV: Skip VF Resizable BAR restore on read error
sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() uses the VF Resizable BAR Control register
to decide how many VF BARs to restore (nbars) and which VF BAR each
iteration addresses (bar_idx). bar_idx indexes into dev->sriov->barsz[],
which has only PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS (6) entries.
When a device does not respond, config reads typically return
PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE (~0). Both fields are 3 bits wide, so nbars and bar_idx
both evaluate to 7. The barsz[] access then goes out of bounds. UBSAN
reports this as:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/pci/iov.c:948:51 index 7 is out of range for type 'resource_size_t [6]'
Observed on an NVIDIA RTX PRO 1000 GPU (GB207GLM) that stopped responding
during a failed GC6 power state exit. The subsequent pci_restore_state()
invoked sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() while config reads returned
0xffffffff, triggering the splat.
Bail out if any VF Resizable BAR Control read returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE.
No further VF BARs are touched, which is safe because a config read that
returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE indicates the device is unreachable and
restoration is pointless. This mirrors the guard in
pci_restore_rebar_state().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.0): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.0 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.0 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-27). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it