In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
procfs: avoid fetching build ID while holding VMA lock
Fix PROCMAP_QUERY to fetch optional build ID only after dropping mmap_lock
or per-VMA lock, whichever was used to lock VMA under question, to avoid
deadlock reported by syzbot:
-> #1 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
__might_fault+0xed/0x170
_copy_to_iter+0x118/0x1720
copy_page_to_iter+0x12d/0x1e0
filemap_read+0x720/0x10a0
blkdev_read_iter+0x2b5/0x4e0
vfs_read+0x7f4/0xae0
ksys_read+0x12a/0x250
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
-> #0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8){++++}-{4:4}:
__lock_acquire+0x1509/0x26d0
lock_acquire+0x185/0x340
down_read+0x98/0x490
blkdev_read_iter+0x2a7/0x4e0
__kernel_read+0x39a/0xa90
freader_fetch+0x1d5/0xa80
__build_id_parse.isra.0+0xea/0x6a0
do_procmap_query+0xd75/0x1050
procfs_procmap_ioctl+0x7a/0xb0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#8);
* DEADLOCK *
This seems to be exacerbated (as we haven't seen these syzbot reports
before that) by the recent:
777a8560fd29 ("lib/buildid: use __kernel_read() for sleepable context")
To make this safe, we need to grab file refcount while VMA is still locked, but
other than that everything is pretty straightforward. Internal build_id_parse()
API assumes VMA is passed, but it only needs the underlying file reference, so
just add another variant build_id_parse_file() that expects file passed
directly.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up kerneldoc]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it