In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: Prevent sending WMI commands to firmware during firmware crash
Currently, we encounter the following kernel call trace when a firmware
crash occurs. This happens because the host sends WMI commands to the
firmware while it is in recovery, causing the commands to fail and
resulting in the kernel call trace.
Set the ATH12K_FLAG_CRASH_FLUSH and ATH12K_FLAG_RECOVERY flags when the
host driver receives the firmware crash notification from MHI. This
prevents sending WMI commands to the firmware during recovery.
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x75/0xc0
register_lock_class+0x6be/0x7a0
? __lock_acquire+0x644/0x19a0
__lock_acquire+0x95/0x19a0
lock_acquire+0x265/0x310
? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]
? find_held_lock+0x34/0xa0
? ath12k_ce_send+0x56/0x210 [ath12k]
_raw_spin_lock_bh+0x33/0x70
? ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]
ath12k_ce_send+0xa2/0x210 [ath12k]
ath12k_htc_send+0x178/0x390 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_cmd_send_nowait+0x76/0xa0 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_cmd_send+0x62/0x190 [ath12k]
ath12k_wmi_pdev_bss_chan_info_request+0x62/0xc0 [ath1
ath12k_mac_op_get_survey+0x2be/0x310 [ath12k]
ieee80211_dump_survey+0x99/0x240 [mac80211]
nl80211_dump_survey+0xe7/0x470 [cfg80211]
? kmalloc_reserve+0x59/0xf0
genl_dumpit+0x24/0x70
netlink_dump+0x177/0x360
__netlink_dump_start+0x206/0x280
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit.isra.22+0x8a/0xe0
? genl_family_rcv_msg_attrs_parse.isra.23+0xe0/0xe0
? genl_op_lock.part.12+0x10/0x10
? genl_dumpit+0x70/0x70
genl_rcv_msg+0x1d0/0x290
? nl80211_del_station+0x330/0x330 [cfg80211]
? genl_get_cmd_both+0x50/0x50
netlink_rcv_skb+0x4f/0x100
genl_rcv+0x1f/0x30
netlink_unicast+0x1b6/0x260
netlink_sendmsg+0x31a/0x450
__sock_sendmsg+0xa8/0xb0
____sys_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x260
___sys_sendmsg+0x89/0xe0
? local_clock_noinstr+0xb/0xc0
? rcu_is_watching+0xd/0x40
? kfree+0x1de/0x370
? __sys_sendmsg+0x7a/0xc0
Tested-on: QCN9274 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.WBE.1.4.1-00199-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it