In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix use-after free in init error and remove paths
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() registers a cleanup handler to run when
the associated (platform-) device is being released. For UFS, the
crypto private data and pointers are stored as part of the ufs_hba's
data structure 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This structure is
allocated as part of the underlying ufshcd and therefore Scsi_host
allocation.
During driver release or during error handling in ufshcd_pltfrm_init(),
this structure is released as part of ufshcd_dealloc_host() before the
(platform-) device associated with the crypto call above is released.
Once this device is released, the crypto cleanup code will run, using
the just-released 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This causes a
use-after-free situation:
Call trace:
kfree+0x60/0x2d8 (P)
kvfree+0x44/0x60
blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback+0x28/0x70
devm_action_release+0x1c/0x30
release_nodes+0x6c/0x108
devres_release_all+0x98/0x100
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x70
really_probe+0x218/0x2d0
In other words, the initialisation code flow is:
platform-device probe
ufshcd_pltfrm_init()
ufshcd_alloc_host()
scsi_host_alloc()
allocation of struct ufs_hba
creation of scsi-host devices
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()
devm registration of cleanup handler using platform-device
and during error handling of ufshcd_pltfrm_init() or during driver
removal:
ufshcd_dealloc_host()
scsi_host_put()
put_device(scsi-host)
release of struct ufs_hba
put_device(platform-device)
crypto cleanup handler
To fix this use-after free, change ufshcd_alloc_host() to register a
devres action to automatically cleanup the underlying SCSI device on
ufshcd destruction, without requiring explicit calls to
ufshcd_dealloc_host(). This way:
* the crypto profile and all other ufs_hba-owned resources are
destroyed before SCSI (as they've been registered after)
* a memleak is plugged in tc-dwc-g210-pci.c remove() as a
side-effect
* EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ufshcd_dealloc_host) can be removed fully as
it's not needed anymore
* no future drivers using ufshcd_alloc_host() could ever forget
adding the cleanup
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-02). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it