In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ionic: fix kernel panic due to multi-buffer handling
Currently, the ionic_run_xdp() doesn't handle multi-buffer packets
properly for XDP_TX and XDP_REDIRECT.
When a jumbo frame is received, the ionic_run_xdp() first makes xdp
frame with all necessary pages in the rx descriptor.
And if the action is either XDP_TX or XDP_REDIRECT, it should unmap
dma-mapping and reset page pointer to NULL for all pages, not only the
first page.
But it doesn't for SG pages. So, SG pages unexpectedly will be reused.
It eventually causes kernel panic.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x504f4e4dbebc64ff: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3+ #25
RIP: 0010:xdp_return_frame+0x42/0x90
Code: 01 75 12 5b 4c 89 e6 5d 31 c9 41 5c 31 d2 41 5d e9 73 fd ff ff 44 8b 6b 20 0f b7 43 0a 49 81 ed 68 01 00 00 49 29 c5 49 01 fd <41> 80 7d0
RSP: 0018:ffff99d00122ce08 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000005453 RBX: ffff8d325f904000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 00000000670e1000 RSI: 000000011f90d000 RDI: 504f4e4d4c4b4a49
RBP: ffff99d003907740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000011f90d000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8d325f904010
R13: 504f4e4dbebc64fd R14: ffff8d3242b070c8 R15: ffff99d0039077c0
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d399f780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f41f6c85e38 CR3: 000000037ac30000 CR4: 00000000007506f0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? die_addr+0x33/0x90
? exc_general_protection+0x251/0x2f0
? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30
? xdp_return_frame+0x42/0x90
ionic_tx_clean+0x211/0x280 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015]
ionic_tx_cq_service+0xd3/0x210 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015]
ionic_txrx_napi+0x41/0x1b0 [ionic 15881354510e6a9c655c59c54812b319ed2cd015]
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0x29/0x1b0
net_rx_action+0x2c4/0x350
handle_softirqs+0xf4/0x320
irq_exit_rcu+0x78/0xa0
common_interrupt+0x77/0x90
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it