In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cifs: Fix writeback data corruption
cifs writeback doesn't correctly handle the case where
cifs_extend_writeback() hits a point where it is considering an additional
folio, but this would overrun the wsize - at which point it drops out of
the xarray scanning loop and calls xas_pause(). The problem is that
xas_pause() advances the loop counter - thereby skipping that page.
What needs to happen is for xas_reset() to be called any time we decide we
don't want to process the page we're looking at, but rather send the
request we are building and start a new one.
Fix this by copying and adapting the netfslib writepages code as a
temporary measure, with cifs writeback intending to be offloaded to
netfslib in the near future.
This also fixes the issue with the use of filemap_get_folios_tag() causing
retry of a bunch of pages which the extender already dealt with.
This can be tested by creating, say, a 64K file somewhere not on cifs
(otherwise copy-offload may get underfoot), mounting a cifs share with a
wsize of 64000, copying the file to it and then comparing the original file
and the copy:
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/tmp/64K bs=64k count=1
mount //192.168.6.1/test /mnt -o user=...,pass=...,wsize=64000
cp /tmp/64K /mnt/64K
cmp /tmp/64K /mnt/64K
Without the fix, the cmp fails at position 64000 (or shortly thereafter).
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-27). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it