In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vfio/type1: fix cap_migration information leak
Fix an information leak where an uninitialized hole in struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration on the stack is exposed to userspace.
The definition of struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration contains a hole as shown in this pahole(1) output:
struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration { struct vfio_info_cap_header header; /* 0 8 */ __u32 flags; /* 8 4 */
/* XXX 4 bytes hole, try to pack */
__u64 pgsize_bitmap; /* 16 8 */ __u64 max_dirty_bitmap_size; /* 24 8 */
/* size: 32, cachelines: 1, members: 4 */ /* sum members: 28, holes: 1, sum holes: 4 */ /* last cacheline: 32 bytes */ };
The cap_mig variable is filled in without initializing the hole:
static int vfio_iommu_migration_build_caps(struct vfio_iommu *iommu, struct vfio_info_cap *caps) { struct vfio_iommu_type1_info_cap_migration cap_mig;
cap_mig.header.id = VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1_INFO_CAP_MIGRATION; cap_mig.header.version = 1;
cap_mig.flags = 0; /* support minimum pgsize */ cap_mig.pgsize_bitmap = (size_t)1 << __ffs(iommu->pgsize_bitmap); cap_mig.max_dirty_bitmap_size = DIRTY_BITMAP_SIZE_MAX;
return vfio_info_add_capability(caps, &cap_mig.header, sizeof(cap_mig)); }
The structure is then copied to a temporary location on the heap. At this point it's already too late and ioctl(VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO) copies it to userspace later:
int vfio_info_add_capability(struct vfio_info_cap *caps, struct vfio_info_cap_header *cap, size_t size) { struct vfio_info_cap_header *header;
header = vfio_info_cap_add(caps, size, cap->id, cap->version); if (IS_ERR(header)) return PTR_ERR(header);
memcpy(header + 1, cap + 1, size - sizeof(*header));
return 0; }
This issue was found by code inspection.