In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: da9121: Fix uninit-value in da9121_assign_chip_model()
KASAN report slab-out-of-bounds in __regmap_init as follows:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __regmap_init drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c:841
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88803678cdf1 by task xrun/9137
CPU: 0 PID: 9137 Comm: xrun Tainted: G W 5.18.0-rc2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x15a lib/dump_stack.c:88
print_report.cold+0xcd/0x69b mm/kasan/report.c:313
kasan_report+0x8e/0xc0 mm/kasan/report.c:491
__regmap_init+0x4540/0x4ba0 drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c:841
__devm_regmap_init+0x7a/0x100 drivers/base/regmap/regmap.c:1266
__devm_regmap_init_i2c+0x65/0x80 drivers/base/regmap/regmap-i2c.c:394
da9121_i2c_probe+0x386/0x6d1 drivers/regulator/da9121-regulator.c:1039
i2c_device_probe+0x959/0xac0 drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:563
This happend when da9121 device is probe by da9121_i2c_id, but with
invalid dts. Thus, chip->subvariant_id is set to -EINVAL, and later
da9121_assign_chip_model() will access 'regmap' without init it.
Fix it by return -EINVAL from da9121_assign_chip_model() if
'chip->subvariant_id' is invalid.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it