In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8712: fix uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init()
When 'tmpU1b' returns from r8712_read8(padapter, EE_9346CR) is 0,
'mac[6]' will not be initialized.
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init+0x2d54/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:541
r871xu_drv_init+0x2d54/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:541
usb_probe_interface+0xf19/0x1600 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
really_probe+0x653/0x14b0 drivers/base/dd.c:596
__driver_probe_device+0x3e9/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:752
driver_probe_device drivers/base/dd.c:782 [inline]
__device_attach_driver+0x79f/0x1120 drivers/base/dd.c:899
bus_for_each_drv+0x2d6/0x3f0 drivers/base/bus.c:427
__device_attach+0x593/0x8e0 drivers/base/dd.c:970
device_initial_probe+0x4a/0x60 drivers/base/dd.c:1017
bus_probe_device+0x17b/0x3e0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
device_add+0x1fff/0x26e0 drivers/base/core.c:3405
usb_set_configuration+0x37e9/0x3ed0 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
usb_generic_driver_probe+0x13c/0x300 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
usb_probe_device+0x309/0x570 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293
really_probe+0x653/0x14b0 drivers/base/dd.c:596
__driver_probe_device+0x3e9/0x530 drivers/base/dd.c:752
driver_probe_device drivers/base/dd.c:782 [inline]
__device_attach_driver+0x79f/0x1120 drivers/base/dd.c:899
bus_for_each_drv+0x2d6/0x3f0 drivers/base/bus.c:427
__device_attach+0x593/0x8e0 drivers/base/dd.c:970
device_initial_probe+0x4a/0x60 drivers/base/dd.c:1017
bus_probe_device+0x17b/0x3e0 drivers/base/bus.c:487
device_add+0x1fff/0x26e0 drivers/base/core.c:3405
usb_new_device+0x1b8e/0x2950 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2566
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5358 [inline]
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5502 [inline]
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5660 [inline]
hub_event+0x58e3/0x89e0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5742
process_one_work+0xdb6/0x1820 kernel/workqueue.c:2307
worker_thread+0x10b3/0x21e0 kernel/workqueue.c:2454
kthread+0x3c7/0x500 kernel/kthread.c:377
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
Local variable mac created at:
r871xu_drv_init+0x1771/0x3070 drivers/staging/rtl8712/usb_intf.c:394
usb_probe_interface+0xf19/0x1600 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
KMSAN: uninit-value in r871xu_drv_init
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=3cd92b1d85428b128503bfa7a250294c9ae00bd8
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it