In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: chipidea: ci_hdrc_imx: Also search for 'phys' phandle
When passing 'phys' in the devicetree to describe the USB PHY phandle
(which is the recommended way according to
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/usb/ci-hdrc-usb2.txt) the
following NULL pointer dereference is observed on i.MX7 and i.MX8MM:
[ 1.489344] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000098
[ 1.498170] Mem abort info:
[ 1.500966] ESR = 0x96000044
[ 1.504030] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1.509356] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1.512416] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1.515569] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 1.520458] Data abort info:
[ 1.523349] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000044
[ 1.527196] CM = 0, WnR = 1
[ 1.530176] [0000000000000098] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 1.536544] Internal error: Oops: 96000044 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 1.542125] Modules linked in:
[ 1.545190] CPU: 3 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.14.0-dirty #3
[ 1.551901] Hardware name: Kontron i.MX8MM N801X S (DT)
[ 1.557133] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 1.562984] pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)
[ 1.568998] pc : imx7d_charger_detection+0x3f0/0x510
[ 1.573973] lr : imx7d_charger_detection+0x22c/0x510
This happens because the charger functions check for the phy presence
inside the imx_usbmisc_data structure (data->usb_phy), but the chipidea
core populates the usb_phy passed via 'phys' inside 'struct ci_hdrc'
(ci->usb_phy) instead.
This causes the NULL pointer dereference inside imx7d_charger_detection().
Fix it by also searching for 'phys' in case 'fsl,usbphy' is not found.
Tested on a imx7s-warp board.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it