RHSA-2026:57614HighCVSS 8.2

Red Hat Security Advisory: Red Hat Hardened Images RPMs bug fix and enhancement update

Published
August 20, 2026
Last Modified
October 22, 2026

🔗 CVE IDs covered (17)

CVE-2026-41411 →CVE-2026-43961 →CVE-2026-44656 →CVE-2026-47167 →CVE-2026-52859 →CVE-2026-39881 →CVE-2026-46483 →CVE-2026-47162 →CVE-2026-45130 →CVE-2026-52858 →CVE-2026-52860 →CVE-2026-57454 →CVE-2026-73073 →CVE-2026-34982 →CVE-2026-35177 →CVE-2026-57451 →CVE-2026-57453 →

📋 Description

CVE-2026-34982 — vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass CVE-2026-35177 — vim: Vim zip.vim plugin: Arbitrary file overwrite via path traversal bypass CVE-2026-39881 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via command injection in NetBeans interface CVE-2026-41411 — vim: Command injection allows arbitrary code execution via malicious tag files CVE-2026-43961 — vim: Vimscript injection via unescaped filename in netrw s:NetrwMarkFile() filter() expression allows arbitrary code execution CVE-2026-44656 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary command execution via :find command-line completion CVE-2026-45130 — vim: Vim: Heap buffer overflow allows arbitrary code execution or denial of service CVE-2026-46483 — vim: command injection when decompressing .tgz archives CVE-2026-47162 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary Code Execution via crafted directory names CVE-2026-47167 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted step-definition patterns CVE-2026-52858 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via Python omni-completion CVE-2026-52859 — vim: Vim: Denial of Service via out-of-bounds write in terminal handling CVE-2026-52860 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution through Python omni-completion. CVE-2026-57451 — vim: Vim: Denial of service via crafted undo file CVE-2026-57453 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via crafted zip archive entry names CVE-2026-57454 — vim: Vim: Out-of-bounds Read with Text Properties CVE-2026-73073 — vim: Vim: Arbitrary command execution via crafted tags file in C omni-completion

🎯 Affected products18

  • Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-X11-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-X11-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-common-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-common-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-data-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-data-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-default-editor-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-default-editor-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-enhanced-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-enhanced-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-filesystem-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-filesystem-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@noarch@public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-minimal-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • vim-minimal-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • xxd-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
  • xxd-2:9.2.967-1.1.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images

✅ Remediation

For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Workaround: To mitigate this issue, disable the modeline support by adding the following command to the Vim configuration file: ~~~ set nomodeline ~~~ Workaround: Avoid opening untrusted zip archives with Vim. This operational control prevents the necessary user interaction required to trigger the path traversal vulnerability in the `zip.vim` plugin. Workaround: Users should refrain to connect to untrusted netbeans server. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue involves exercising caution when opening or processing tag files from untrusted sources. Users should avoid loading tag files from unknown or suspicious origins to prevent the execution of arbitrary commands. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, users should avoid browsing untrusted directories or interacting with files from untrusted sources using Vim's netrw plugin. Exercise caution when opening directories that may contain maliciously crafted filenames. Workaround: Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability. Workaround: To mitigate this vulnerability, do not decompress untrusted .tgz archives with the Vimuntar command. Use 'tar -x -z -f' directly, instead. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, users should exercise caution when opening untrusted files or repositories with Vim, particularly those that might trigger the `cucumber` filetype plugin. Avoiding interaction with untrusted content can prevent the execution of malicious step-definition patterns. Workaround: Users can mitigate this vulnerability by disabling Python omni-completion in Vim if it is not essential for their workflow. This prevents the execution of untrusted Python code when opening hostile files. To disable this feature, ensure that the `omnifunc` option in your Vim configuration (e.g., `~/.vimrc`) is not set to `pythoncomplete#Complete` or `python3complete#Complete`. Alternatively, users should avoid invoking omni-completion (`Ctrl-X Ctrl-O`) on Python files from untrusted sources. Disabling Python omni-completion may affect Python development functionality within Vim. Workaround: Users should exercise caution when opening untrusted files or executing untrusted programs within vim's `:terminal` window. Avoiding interaction with untrusted content in this context can prevent the exploitation of this vulnerability, which leads to a denial of service. Workaround: Users are advised to avoid opening or processing undo files from untrusted or unknown sources. If your team compiles Vim from source, ensure standard compiler security flags (like -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 or 3) are enabled. This provides a safety net by detecting out-of-bounds reads and safely terminating the application before exploitation can occur. Workaround: To mitigate this issue, users should avoid opening C source files from untrusted sources, especially when accompanied by untrusted tags files. Exercise caution when invoking C omni-completion (CTRL-X CTRL-O) on files from unknown or suspicious origins.

🔗 References (21)