OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing
🔗 CVE IDs covered (1)
📋 Description
Impact
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.
Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:
- OAuth2 Proxy is configured with
--reverse-proxy - and at least one rule is defined with
--skip_auth_routesor the legacy--skip-auth-regex
OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied X-Forwarded-Uri header when --reverse-proxy is enabled and --skip-auth-route or --skip-auth-regex is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.
This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.
Patches
This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced --trusted-proxy-ip flag in v7.15.2. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will continue to trust ALL source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new --trusted-proxy-ip flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send X-Forwarded-* headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.
Mitigation
-
Strip any client-provided
X-Forwarded-Uriheader at the reverse proxy or load balancer level -
Explicitly overwrite
X-Forwarded-Uriwith the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 ProxyExample nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:
location /internal-auth/ { internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path # Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from. proxy_set_header Host $host; proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr; # set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri; proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/; } -
Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy
-
Remove or narrow
--skip-auth-route/--skip-auth-regexrules where possible
🎯 Affected products1
- go/github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7:>= 7.5.0, < 7.15.2
🔗 References (6)
- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40575
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-40575
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2460449
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-40575.json
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x