EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •CISA's Vulnrichment rates exploitation as PoC; EchelonGraph holds no exploit-code reference for it
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.6%CVSS: 6.5Exploit: No code on recordExposed services: Not assessed
A fix is available — apply it.
Fixed versions, as the CVE record's CNA (CPAN Security Group) states them: "Upgrade to Lemonldap-NG-Handler 2.16.10, 2.21.6 or 2.23.4 or later."
Lemonldap::NG::Handler versions from 2.0.0 before 2.16.10, from 2.17.0 before 2.21.6, from 2.22.0 before 2.23.4 for Perl allow an equivalent spelling of a path to bypass the locationRules that restrict it.
The handler matches each vhost's locationRules regular expressions against REQUEST_URI, the raw request line, while the web server routes on the path it has already percent-decoded and normalized. A request that percent-encodes a character of the path, inserts dot segments, or doubles a slash therefore reaches the protected resource under a URI that no rule regexp matches, and the vhost's default rule decides access. Deny rules, identity and group conditions, and unprotect and skip rules are bypassed alike.
Only a vhost whose default rule is more permissive than its other rules is affected. An authenticated user then reaches any URL a locationRules regexp was meant to restrict, but gains no more than that default rule already grants.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS. FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it