In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
svcrdma: Validate Read chunk positions before reconstruction
The RPC/RDMA Read chunk position field is supplied by the remote
client and stored verbatim in the parsed chunk list.
xdr_count_read_segments() checks only 4-byte alignment; it never
compares the position against the received inline body length.
In the single-chunk path, svc_rdma_read_complete_one() splits the
head and tail kvecs at ch_position. A position past the inline
body underflows the tail length, exposing adjacent slab memory to
the upper XDR decoder.
In the multi-chunk path, svc_rdma_read_multiple_chunks() computes
gap lengths between chunks as unsigned subtractions from
ch_position. Overlapping Read chunks cause these subtractions to
underflow. A final position past the inline body likewise
underflows the trailing gap length. svc_rdma_copy_inline_range()
then copies past the receive buffer into request pages that are
returned to the client through the Reply channel.
Bound inline-range copies in svc_rdma_copy_inline_range() against
the decoded inline RPC body saved in rc_saved_arg. Reject a
single Read chunk positioned beyond that body, and reject
multi-chunk lists where accumulated read bytes exceed the next
chunk's position. Apply the same position and overlap checks in
the call-chunk interleaving path.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.7% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-01). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it