Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input vulnerability in ash-project ash lets an attacker confuse the stored type tag of an Ash.Type.Union value that uses storage: :map_with_tag, bypassing that member's validation and any tag-based authorization.
For a union with storage: :map_with_tag, each member is identified in storage by a configured tag and tag_value. Ash.Type.Union.dump_to_native/2 (lib/ash/type/union.ex) did not force the configured tag when writing the value, so a tag carried in the submitted value was persisted verbatim. An attacker can therefore store a value whose data belongs to one member but whose tag names a different member. On read the value is re-selected by its tag and treated as the incompatible member (a type confusion), bypassing the real member's constraints and any logic or policy that branches on the union tag. The fix drops any incoming tag and forces the configured tag value on dump.
This issue affects ash: from 2.14.18 before 3.32.2.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (2.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 2.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 2.1 LOWCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-29). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it