Missing authorization in Apache Wicket.
org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.Form resolves the component that submitted a form from the request parameters in Form#onRequest() and passes the result directly to Form#onFormSubmitted(IFormSubmitter). The check that the submitting component is visible and enabled in its hierarchy runs only when onFormSubmitted() is given no submitter, so it no longer runs for an ordinary form submission, and it is the only point at which Wicket verifies that the application actually offered the named control to the caller. Form#findSubmitter() matches on the request parameter name alone and applies no visibility or enablement filter, and the request handler checks only the form itself, which is visible and enabled. A request that names a submit button the application withheld therefore reaches that button's onSubmit() and onAfterSubmit(), and its onError() when form validation fails; where the button sets setDefaultFormProcessing(false) it reaches onSubmit() and onAfterSubmit() without any form validation.
An application is affected where a form submitting component, such as a Button or a SubmitLink, is unavailable to the caller while the enclosing form remains available. How the component was made unavailable does not matter: the component's own setVisible(false), setEnabled(false) or setVisibilityAllowed(false), an overridden isVisible() or isEnabled(), an invisible or disabled parent container anywhere above it, and a RENDER or ENABLE denial from IAuthorizationStrategy — for example through MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy or the AuthorizeAction annotation — are all enforced by that one check, and all of them are bypassed. A component that renders as disabled carries its own input name in the markup the caller already holds. Submissions made through AjaxFormSubmitBehavior, and therefore through AjaxButton and AjaxSubmitLink, are not affected: those are invoked as a behaviour on the button itself, the behaviour's invocation is authorized against that button, and the non-Ajax callbacks of those two classes do nothing. Restrictions applied to the form or to the page rather than to the submitting component are unaffected.
The 9.x and 8.x release lines, and the unsupported lines before them, are not affected; the behaviour was introduced in 10.3.0.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 10.3.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.12.0, which fixes the issue.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.9): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.9 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.9 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.a secondary CVSS source · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- Unknown (no EPSS on record)Unknown, not low: FIRST has published no EPSS probability for this CVE.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
The CVE record names the fixed release. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact partial (CVSS v4.0 confidentiality and integrity impact neither High). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact partial (CVSS v4.0 confidentiality and integrity impact neither High). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it