Apache Airflow's Teradata provider embedded cloud storage credentials directly into SQL statements. S3ToTeradataOperator and AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator interpolate the source bucket's credentials as plain string literals into the CREATE MULTISET TABLE ... LOCATION statement whenever the bucket is private and no teradata_authorization_name is configured — which is the default credential path for both operators. The statement is then logged and executed, so the credentials reach two places outside the operator's control.
The two operators expose different credentials through different channels, and deployments should check both. S3ToTeradataOperator takes its values from s3_hook.get_credentials(), which under an instance profile or IRSA returns runtime AWS credentials that were never registered with Airflow's secrets masker — and the STS session token is runtime-generated and therefore unmasked even when an AWS connection is configured. Those credentials appear in the Airflow task log, readable by any user with log-view permission on the Dag. AzureBlobStorageToTeradataOperator takes its storage account key from the connection, so the masker usually redacts the task-log copy; its exposure is the Teradata side. Both operators write the credentials into Teradata's DBQL query logs and live monitoring views, where Airflow's masking never applies and the values persist for that system's log retention period.
Affects deployments using either operator against a private bucket or container without a Teradata AUTHORIZATION object. Users are advised to upgrade to apache-airflow-providers-teradata 3.7.0 or later, which keeps the credential-bearing statement out of the Airflow task log. Upgrading does not remove the credentials from Teradata's query logs and monitoring views, which Airflow cannot redact: users should configure teradata_authorization_name with a Teradata AUTHORIZATION object so that credentials are never inlined, and should rotate any credentials previously used through the inline path.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.4% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-28). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
The CVE record names the fixed release. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it