In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_conntrack_expect: use conntrack GC to reap expectations
This patch replaces the timer API by GC worker approach for
expectations, as it already happened in many other subsystems.
Use the existing conntrack GC worker to iterate over the local list of
expectations in the master conntrack to reap expired expectations.
Check IPS_HELPER_BIT to run GC for expectations, set it on for nft_ct
expectation which nevers sets it. Hold the expectation spinlock while
iterating over the master conntrack expectation list to synchronize with
nf_ct_remove_expectations(). This also performs runtime packet path
garbage collection through the expectation insertion and lookup
functions while walking over one of the chains of the global expectation
hashtables. Unconfirmed conntrack entries are skipped since ct->ext can
be reallocated and dying are skipped since those will be gone soon.
Set on IPS_HELPER_BIT if the helper ct extension is added, then the new
GC worker does not need to bump the ct refcount to check if the ct->ext
helper is available.
This removes the extra bump on the refcount for expectation timers, this
allows to remove several nf_ct_expect_put() calls after the unlink,
after this update only refcount remains at 1 while on the expectation
hashes.
This patch implicitly addresses a race with the existing timer API
allowing an expectation to access a stale exp->master pointer which has
been already released when expectation removal loses races with an
expiring timer, ie. timer_del() reporting false.
Add a new NF_CT_EXPECT_DEAD flag to reap this expectation via GC. This
is needed by nf_conntrack_unexpect_related() which is called in error
paths to invalidate newly created expectations that has been added into
the hashes. These expectactions cannot be inmediately released as GC or
nf_ct_remove_expectations() could race to make it. On expectation
insert, the runtime GC reaps stale expectations before checking the
expectation limit set by policy.
Set current timestamp in nf_ct_expect_alloc(), then add the expectation
policy timeout (or custom timeout specified added on top of this) to
specify the expectation lifetime.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.8 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.7% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-31). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)3 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it