ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener protects a Wicket application against cross-site request forgery by rejecting requests that a resource isolation policy judges to come from another origin. Its default policy, FetchMetadataResourceIsolationPolicy, was derived from a reference implementation written to guard static resources, and it inherited two allowances that are unsafe when the thing being guarded is an action on a page:
* Every "simple top-level navigation" was allowed. Any GET request carrying Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate whose Sec-Fetch-Dest was neither object nor embed was allowed, whatever Sec-Fetch-Site said — including cross-site. Wicket invokes component listeners (Link.onClick(), form submits, behaviour callbacks) through ordinary GET navigations, so a page under an attacker's control could navigate the victim's browser to a listener URL and have that listener run inside the victim's authenticated session. Browsers send SameSite=Lax cookies — the effective default when no SameSite attribute is set — on cross-site top-level GET navigations, so the victim's session cookie accompanied the request.
* Sec-Fetch-Site: same-site was allowed unconditionally. That value means the same registrable domain and scheme but a different origin — another subdomain or another port. Any sibling origin could therefore invoke any listener by any method, POST form submits included, and cookies are always sent on same-site requests regardless of SameSite. A hostile sibling origin obtained through a subdomain takeover, through delegated user content, or through an XSS elsewhere on the site could act as the authenticated user.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.24.0 or 10.11.0, which fix the issue.
Affected versions
* Apache Wicket 9.1.0 through 9.23.0
* Apache Wicket 10.0.0 through 10.10.0
Not affected
Any release older than 9.1.0:
* Apache Wicket 8.x (8.0.0 through 8.17.0). The resource isolation classes do not exist in the 8.x line, which offers only the Origin/Referer-based CsrfPreventionRequestCycleListener. No 8.x release requires a fix.
* Apache Wicket 9.0.0. ResourceIsolationRequestCycleListener and FetchMetadataResourceIsolationPolicy were introduced by WICKET-6786 and first shipped in 9.1.0 (released 2020-10-07).
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (4.6): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 4.6 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 4.6 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
The CVE record names the fixed release. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it