In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ioam6: fix OOB and missing lock
When trace->type.bit6 is set:
if (trace->type.bit6) {
...
queue = skb_get_tx_queue(dev, skb);
qdisc = rcu_dereference(queue->qdisc);
This code can lead to an out-of-bounds access of the dev->_tx[] array
when is_input is true. In such a case, the packet is on the RX path and
skb->queue_mapping contains the RX queue index of the ingress device. If
the ingress device has more RX queues than the egress device (dev) has
TX queues, skb_get_queue_mapping(skb) will exceed dev->num_tx_queues.
Add a check to avoid this situation since skb_get_tx_queue() does not
clamp the index. This issue has also revealed that per queue visibility
cannot be accurate and will be replaced later as a new feature.
While at it, add missing lock around qdisc_qstats_qlen_backlog(). The
function __ioam6_fill_trace_data() is called from both softirq and
process contexts, hence the use of spin_lock_bh() here.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.1 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-11-02). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it