A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package. The vulnerability stems from an unimplemented feature in the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next, which allowed unauthenticated users to proxy arbitrary remote content via the /_next/image endpoint.
This issue allowed attackers to load remote resources from arbitrary hosts under the victim site’s domain for any site deployed using the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next.
For example:
https://victim-site.com/_next/image?url=https://attacker.com
In this example, attacker-controlled content from attacker.com is served through the victim site’s domain (victim-site.com), violating the same-origin policy and potentially misleading users or other services.
Impact:
* SSRF via unrestricted remote URL loading
* Arbitrary remote content loading
* Potential internal service exposure or phishing risks through domain abuse
Mitigation:
The following mitigations have been put in place:
* Server side updates to Cloudflare’s platform to restrict the content loaded via the /_next/image endpoint to images. The update automatically mitigates the issue for all existing and any future sites deployed to Cloudflare using the affected version of the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next
* Root cause fix https://github.com/opennextjs/opennextjs-cloudflare/pull/727 to the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. The patched version of the adapter is found here @opennextjs/cloudflare@1.3.0 https://www.npmjs.com/package/@opennextjs/cloudflare/v/1.3.0
* Package dependency update https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-sdk/pull/9608 to create-cloudflare (c3) to use the fixed version of the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next. The patched version of create-cloudflare is found here: create-cloudflare@2.49.3 https://www.npmjs.com/package/create-cloudflare/v/2.49.3
In addition to the automatic mitigation deployed on Cloudflare’s platform, we encourage affected users to upgrade to @opennext/cloudflare v1.3.0 and use the remotePatterns https://nextjs.org/docs/pages/api-reference/components/image#remotepatterns filter in Next config https://nextjs.org/docs/pages/api-reference/components/image#remotepatterns if they need to allow-list external urls with images assets.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (9.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 9.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 9.1 CRITICALCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.NVD CVSS v3 · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 1.0% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-31). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Attend at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines at low or medium mission impact and sooner than that at high.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; 60 days if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable yes (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it