In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: KVM: Fix stack protector issue in send_ipi_data()
Function kvm_io_bus_read() is called in function send_ipi_data(), buffer
size of parameter *val should be at least 8 bytes. Since some emulation
functions like loongarch_ipi_readl() and kvm_eiointc_read() will write
the buffer *val with 8 bytes signed extension regardless parameter len.
Otherwise there will be buffer overflow issue when CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
is enabled. The bug report is shown as follows:
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: send_ipi_data+0x194/0x1a0 [kvm]
CPU: 11 UID: 107 PID: 2692 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.17.0-rc1+ #102 PREEMPT(full)
Stack : 9000000005901568 0000000000000000 9000000003af371c 900000013c68c000
900000013c68f850 900000013c68f858 0000000000000000 900000013c68f998
900000013c68f990 900000013c68f990 900000013c68f6c0 fffffffffffdb058
fffffffffffdb0e0 900000013c68f858 911e1d4d39cf0ec2 9000000105657a00
0000000000000001 fffffffffffffffe 0000000000000578 282049464555206e
6f73676e6f6f4c20 0000000000000001 00000000086b4000 0000000000000000
0000000000000000 0000000000000000 9000000005709968 90000000058f9000
900000013c68fa68 900000013c68fab4 90000000029279f0 900000010153f940
900000010001f360 0000000000000000 9000000003af3734 000000004390000c
00000000000000b0 0000000000000004 0000000000000000 0000000000071c1d
...
Call Trace:
[<9000000003af3734>] show_stack+0x5c/0x180
[<9000000003aed168>] dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x9c
[<9000000003ad0ab0>] vpanic+0x108/0x2c4
[<9000000003ad0ca8>] panic+0x3c/0x40
[<9000000004eb0a1c>] __stack_chk_fail+0x14/0x18
[] send_ipi_data+0x190/0x1a0 [kvm]
[] __kvm_io_bus_write+0xa4/0xe8 [kvm]
[] kvm_io_bus_write+0x54/0x90 [kvm]
[] kvm_emu_iocsr+0x180/0x310 [kvm]
[] kvm_handle_gspr+0x280/0x478 [kvm]
[] kvm_handle_exit+0xc0/0x130 [kvm]
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it