In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa/mlx5: Fix release of uninitialized resources on error path
The commit in the fixes tag made sure that mlx5_vdpa_free()
is the single entrypoint for removing the vdpa device resources
added in mlx5_vdpa_dev_add(), even in the cleanup path of
mlx5_vdpa_dev_add().
This means that all functions from mlx5_vdpa_free() should be able to
handle uninitialized resources. This was not the case though:
mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() and mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx()
were not able to do so. This caused the splat below when adding
a vdpa device without a MAC address.
This patch fixes these remaining issues:
- Makes mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources() return early if called on
uninitialized resources.
- Moves mlx5_cmd_init_async_ctx() early on during device addition
because it can't fail. This means that mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx()
also can't fail. To mirror this, move the call site of
mlx5_cmd_cleanup_async_ctx() in mlx5_vdpa_free().
An additional comment was added in mlx5_vdpa_free() to document
the expectations of functions called from this context.
Splat:
mlx5_core 0000:b5:03.2: mlx5_vdpa_dev_add:3950:(pid 2306) warning: No mac address provisioned?
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 2306 at kernel/workqueue.c:4207 __flush_work+0x9a/0xb0
[...]
Call Trace:
? __try_to_del_timer_sync+0x61/0x90
? __timer_delete_sync+0x2b/0x40
mlx5_vdpa_destroy_mr_resources+0x1c/0x40 [mlx5_vdpa]
mlx5_vdpa_free+0x45/0x160 [mlx5_vdpa]
vdpa_release_dev+0x1e/0x50 [vdpa]
device_release+0x31/0x90
kobject_cleanup+0x37/0x130
mlx5_vdpa_dev_add+0x327/0x890 [mlx5_vdpa]
vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x2c1/0x4d0 [vdpa]
genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xd8/0x130
genl_family_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x220
? __pfx_vdpa_nl_cmd_dev_add_set_doit+0x10/0x10 [vdpa]
genl_rcv_msg+0x47/0xa0
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x53/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x27b/0x3b0
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f7/0x430
__sys_sendto+0x1fa/0x210
? ___pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160
? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2b0
? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x51/0x90
? filemap_map_pages+0x515/0x660
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x2c0
? do_read_fault+0x108/0x220
? do_pte_missing+0x14a/0x3e0
? __handle_mm_fault+0x321/0x730
? count_memcg_events+0x13f/0x180
? handle_mm_fault+0x1fb/0x2d0
? do_user_addr_fault+0x20c/0x700
? syscall_exit_work+0x104/0x140
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f0c25b0feca
[...]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it