In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iavf: get rid of the crit lock
Get rid of the crit lock.
That frees us from the error prone logic of try_locks.
Thanks to netdev_lock() by Jakub it is now easy, and in most cases we were
protected by it already - replace crit lock by netdev lock when it was not
the case.
Lockdep reports that we should cancel the work under crit_lock [splat1],
and that was the scheme we have mostly followed since [1] by Slawomir.
But when that is done we still got into deadlocks [splat2]. So instead
we should look at the bigger problem, namely "weird locking/scheduling"
of the iavf. The first step to fix that is to remove the crit lock.
I will followup with a -next series that simplifies scheduling/tasks.
Cancel the work without netdev lock (weird unlock+lock scheme),
to fix the [splat2] (which would be totally ugly if we would kept
the crit lock).
Extend protected part of iavf_watchdog_task() to include scheduling
more work.
Note that the removed comment in iavf_reset_task() was misplaced,
it belonged to inside of the removed if condition, so it's gone now.
[splat1] - w/o this patch - The deadlock during VF removal:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
sh/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
((work_completion)(&(&adapter->watchdog_task)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: start_flush_work+0x1a1/0x470
but task is already holding lock:
(&adapter->crit_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: iavf_remove+0xd1/0x690 [iavf]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[splat2] - when cancelling work under crit lock, w/o this series,
see [2] for the band aid attempt
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
sh/3550 is trying to acquire lock:
((wq_completion)iavf){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: touch_wq_lockdep_map+0x26/0x90
but task is already holding lock:
(&dev->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: iavf_remove+0xa6/0x6e0 [iavf]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[1] fc2e6b3b132a ("iavf: Rework mutexes for better synchronisation")
[2] https://github.com/pkitszel/linux/commit/52dddbfc2bb60294083f5711a158a
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it