In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: fix dereferencing invalid pmd migration entry
When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below. To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early. In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio. Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.
Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-24). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it