In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ptr_ring: do not block hard interrupts in ptr_ring_resize_multiple()
Jakub added a lockdep_assert_no_hardirq() check in __page_pool_put_page()
to increase test coverage.
syzbot found a splat caused by hard irq blocking in
ptr_ring_resize_multiple() [1]
As current users of ptr_ring_resize_multiple() do not require
hard irqs being masked, replace it to only block BH.
Rename helpers to better reflect they are safe against BH only.
- ptr_ring_resize_multiple() to ptr_ring_resize_multiple_bh()
- skb_array_resize_multiple() to skb_array_resize_multiple_bh()
[1]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 __page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9150 Comm: syz.1.1052 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00202-gf8669d7b5f5d #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024
RIP: 0010:__page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]
RIP: 0010:page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780
Code: 74 0e e8 7c aa fb f7 eb 43 e8 75 aa fb f7 eb 3c 65 8b 1d 38 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 a3 ae fb f7 85 db 74 0b e8 5a aa fb f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 1d 65 8b 1d 15 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 84 ae fb f7 85
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000bda6b58 EFLAGS: 00010083
RAX: ffffffff8997e523 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000
RDX: ffffc9000fbd0000 RSI: 0000000000001842 RDI: 0000000000001843
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8997df2c R09: 1ffffd40003a000d
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff940003a000e R12: ffffea0001d00040
R13: ffff88802e8a4000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
FS: 00007fb7aaf716c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fa15a0d4b72 CR3: 00000000561b0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
tun_ptr_free drivers/net/tun.c:617 [inline]
__ptr_ring_swap_queue include/linux/ptr_ring.h:571 [inline]
ptr_ring_resize_multiple_noprof include/linux/ptr_ring.h:643 [inline]
tun_queue_resize drivers/net/tun.c:3694 [inline]
tun_device_event+0xaaf/0x1080 drivers/net/tun.c:3714
notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline]
dev_change_tx_queue_len+0x158/0x2a0 net/core/dev.c:9024
do_setlink+0xff6/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2923
rtnl_setlink+0x40d/0x5a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3201
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73f/0xcf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6647
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it