In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: i2c: tc358743: Fix crash in the probe error path when using polling
If an error occurs in the probe() function, we should remove the polling
timer that was alarmed earlier, otherwise the timer is called with
arguments that are already freed, which results in a crash.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 0 at kernel/time/timer.c:1830 __run_timers+0x244/0x268
Modules linked in:
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.11.0 #226
Hardware name: Diasom DS-RK3568-SOM-EVB (DT)
pstate: 804000c9 (Nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __run_timers+0x244/0x268
lr : __run_timers+0x1d4/0x268
sp : ffffff80eff2baf0
x29: ffffff80eff2bb50 x28: 7fffffffffffffff x27: ffffff80eff2bb00
x26: ffffffc080f669c0 x25: ffffff80efef6bf0 x24: ffffff80eff2bb00
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: dead000000000122 x21: 0000000000000000
x20: ffffff80efef6b80 x19: ffffff80041c8bf8 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: ffffffc06f146000 x16: ffffff80eff27dc0 x15: 000000000000003e
x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 00000000000054da x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 00000000000639c0 x10: 000000000000000c x9 : 0000000000000009
x8 : ffffff80eff2cb40 x7 : ffffff80eff2cb40 x6 : ffffff8002bee480
x5 : ffffffc080cb2220 x4 : ffffffc080cb2150 x3 : 00000000000f4240
x2 : 0000000000000102 x1 : ffffff80eff2bb00 x0 : ffffff80041c8bf0
Call trace:
__run_timers+0x244/0x268
timer_expire_remote+0x50/0x68
tmigr_handle_remote+0x388/0x39c
run_timer_softirq+0x38/0x44
handle_softirqs+0x138/0x298
__do_softirq+0x14/0x20
____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x4c
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x2c
irq_exit_rcu+0x9c/0xcc
el1_interrupt+0x48/0xc0
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x7c/0x80
default_idle_call+0x34/0x68
do_idle+0x23c/0x294
cpu_startup_entry+0x38/0x3c
secondary_start_kernel+0x128/0x160
__secondary_switched+0xb8/0xbc
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (4.7): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 4.7 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 4.7 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it