In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
PCI: tegra194: Move controller cleanups to pex_ep_event_pex_rst_deassert()
Currently, the endpoint cleanup function dw_pcie_ep_cleanup() and EPF
deinit notify function pci_epc_deinit_notify() are called during the
execution of pex_ep_event_pex_rst_assert() i.e., when the host has asserted
PERST#. But quickly after this step, refclk will also be disabled by the
host.
All of the tegra194 endpoint SoCs supported as of now depend on the refclk
from the host for keeping the controller operational. Due to this
limitation, any access to the hardware registers in the absence of refclk
will result in a whole endpoint crash. Unfortunately, most of the
controller cleanups require accessing the hardware registers (like eDMA
cleanup performed in dw_pcie_ep_cleanup(), etc...). So these cleanup
functions can cause the crash in the endpoint SoC once host asserts PERST#.
One way to address this issue is by generating the refclk in the endpoint
itself and not depending on the host. But that is not always possible as
some of the endpoint designs do require the endpoint to consume refclk from
the host.
Thus, fix this crash by moving the controller cleanups to the start of
the pex_ep_event_pex_rst_deassert() function. This function is called
whenever the host has deasserted PERST# and it is guaranteed that the
refclk would be active at this point. So at the start of this function
(after enabling resources) the controller cleanup can be performed. Once
finished, rest of the code execution for PERST# deassert can continue as
usual.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it