In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gts-helper: Fix memory leaks in iio_gts_build_avail_scale_table()
modprobe iio-test-gts and rmmod it, then the following memory leak
occurs:
unreferenced object 0xffffff80c810be00 (size 64):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1654, jiffies 4294913981
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
02 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 ........ ...@...
80 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 08 00 00 ................
backtrace (crc a63d875e):
[<0000000028c1b3c2>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<000000001d6ecc87>] __kmalloc_noprof+0x2bc/0x3c0
[<00000000393795c1>] devm_iio_init_iio_gts+0x4b4/0x16f4
[<0000000071bb4b09>] 0xffffffdf052a62e0
[<000000000315bc18>] 0xffffffdf052a6488
[<00000000f9dc55b5>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<00000000175a3fd4>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000f505065d>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000bbfb0e5d>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80cbfe9e70 (size 16):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 1658, jiffies 4294914015
hex dump (first 16 bytes):
10 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ....@...........
backtrace (crc 857f0cb4):
[<0000000028c1b3c2>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<000000001d6ecc87>] __kmalloc_noprof+0x2bc/0x3c0
[<00000000393795c1>] devm_iio_init_iio_gts+0x4b4/0x16f4
[<0000000071bb4b09>] 0xffffffdf052a62e0
[<000000007d089d45>] 0xffffffdf052a6864
[<00000000f9dc55b5>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<00000000175a3fd4>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000f505065d>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<00000000bbfb0e5d>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
......
It includes 5*5 times "size 64" memory leaks, which correspond to 5 times
test_init_iio_gain_scale() calls with gts_test_gains size 10 (10*size(int))
and gts_test_itimes size 5. It also includes 5*1 times "size 16"
memory leak, which correspond to one time __test_init_iio_gain_scale()
call with gts_test_gains_gain_low size 3 (3*size(int)) and gts_test_itimes
size 5.
The reason is that the per_time_gains[i] is not freed which is allocated in
the "gts->num_itime" for loop in iio_gts_build_avail_scale_table().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it