In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Fix RX buf alloc_size alignment and atomic op panic
The MANA driver's RX buffer alloc_size is passed into napi_build_skb() to
create SKB. skb_shinfo(skb) is located at the end of skb, and its alignment
is affected by the alloc_size passed into napi_build_skb(). The size needs
to be aligned properly for better performance and atomic operations.
Otherwise, on ARM64 CPU, for certain MTU settings like 4000, atomic
operations may panic on the skb_shinfo(skb)->dataref due to alignment fault.
To fix this bug, add proper alignment to the alloc_size calculation.
Sample panic info:
[ 253.298819] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff000129ba5cce
[ 253.300900] Mem abort info:
[ 253.301760] ESR = 0x0000000096000021
[ 253.302825] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 253.304268] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 253.305172] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 253.306103] FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
Call trace:
__skb_clone+0xfc/0x198
skb_clone+0x78/0xe0
raw6_local_deliver+0xfc/0x228
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x80/0x500
ip6_input_finish+0x48/0x80
ip6_input+0x48/0xc0
ip6_sublist_rcv_finish+0x50/0x78
ip6_sublist_rcv+0x1cc/0x2b8
ipv6_list_rcv+0x100/0x150
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x180/0x220
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x198/0x2a8
__napi_poll+0x138/0x250
net_rx_action+0x148/0x330
handle_softirqs+0x12c/0x3a0
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it