In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: intel-vbtn: Protect ACPI notify handler against recursion
Since commit e2ffcda16290 ("ACPI: OSL: Allow Notify () handlers to run on
all CPUs") ACPI notify handlers like the intel-vbtn notify_handler() may
run on multiple CPU cores racing with themselves.
This race gets hit on Dell Venue 7140 tablets when undocking from
the keyboard, causing the handler to try and register priv->switches_dev
twice, as can be seen from the dev_info() message getting logged twice:
[ 83.861800] intel-vbtn INT33D6:00: Registering Intel Virtual Switches input-dev after receiving a switch event
[ 83.861858] input: Intel Virtual Switches as /devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.0/PNP0C09:00/INT33D6:00/input/input17
[ 83.861865] intel-vbtn INT33D6:00: Registering Intel Virtual Switches input-dev after receiving a switch event
After which things go seriously wrong:
[ 83.861872] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1f.0/PNP0C09:00/INT33D6:00/input/input17'
...
[ 83.861967] kobject: kobject_add_internal failed for input17 with -EEXIST, don't try to register things with the same name in the same directory.
[ 83.877338] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000018
...
Protect intel-vbtn notify_handler() from racing with itself with a mutex
to fix this.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it