In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ks8851: Fix deadlock with the SPI chip variant
When SMP is enabled and spinlocks are actually functional then there is
a deadlock with the 'statelock' spinlock between ks8851_start_xmit_spi
and ks8851_irq:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 27s!
call trace:
queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x100/0x284
do_raw_spin_lock+0x34/0x44
ks8851_start_xmit_spi+0x30/0xb8
ks8851_start_xmit+0x14/0x20
netdev_start_xmit+0x40/0x6c
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x6c/0xbc
sch_direct_xmit+0xa4/0x22c
__qdisc_run+0x138/0x3fc
qdisc_run+0x24/0x3c
net_tx_action+0xf8/0x130
handle_softirqs+0x1ac/0x1f0
__do_softirq+0x14/0x20
____do_softirq+0x10/0x1c
call_on_irq_stack+0x3c/0x58
do_softirq_own_stack+0x1c/0x28
__irq_exit_rcu+0x54/0x9c
irq_exit_rcu+0x10/0x1c
el1_interrupt+0x38/0x50
el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24
el1h_64_irq+0x64/0x68
__netif_schedule+0x6c/0x80
netif_tx_wake_queue+0x38/0x48
ks8851_irq+0xb8/0x2c8
irq_thread_fn+0x2c/0x74
irq_thread+0x10c/0x1b0
kthread+0xc8/0xd8
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
This issue has not been identified earlier because tests were done on
a device with SMP disabled and so spinlocks were actually NOPs.
Now use spin_(un)lock_bh for TX queue related locking to avoid execution
of softirq work synchronously that would lead to a deadlock.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.8% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it