In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: use memalloc_nofs_save() in page_cache_ra_order()
See commit f2c817bed58d ("mm: use memalloc_nofs_save in readahead path"),
ensure that page_cache_ra_order() do not attempt to reclaim file-backed
pages too, or it leads to a deadlock, found issue when test ext4 large
folio.
INFO: task DataXceiver for:7494 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:DataXceiver for state:D stack:0 pid:7494 ppid:1 flags:0x00000200
Call trace:
__switch_to+0x14c/0x240
__schedule+0x82c/0xdd0
schedule+0x58/0xf0
io_schedule+0x24/0xa0
__folio_lock+0x130/0x300
migrate_pages_batch+0x378/0x918
migrate_pages+0x350/0x700
compact_zone+0x63c/0xb38
compact_zone_order+0xc0/0x118
try_to_compact_pages+0xb0/0x280
__alloc_pages_direct_compact+0x98/0x248
__alloc_pages+0x510/0x1110
alloc_pages+0x9c/0x130
folio_alloc+0x20/0x78
filemap_alloc_folio+0x8c/0x1b0
page_cache_ra_order+0x174/0x308
ondemand_readahead+0x1c8/0x2b8
page_cache_async_ra+0x68/0xb8
filemap_readahead.isra.0+0x64/0xa8
filemap_get_pages+0x3fc/0x5b0
filemap_splice_read+0xf4/0x280
ext4_file_splice_read+0x2c/0x48 [ext4]
vfs_splice_read.part.0+0xa8/0x118
splice_direct_to_actor+0xbc/0x288
do_splice_direct+0x9c/0x108
do_sendfile+0x328/0x468
__arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x8c/0x148
invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x118
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x4c/0x1f8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x188/0x190
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.NVD CVSS v3 · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it