In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: mediatek: vcodec: Fix oops when HEVC init fails
The stateless HEVC decoder saves the instance pointer in the context
regardless if the initialization worked or not. This caused a use after
free, when the pointer is freed in case of a failure in the deinit
function.
Only store the instance pointer when the initialization was successful,
to solve this issue.
Hardware name: Acer Tomato (rev3 - 4) board (DT)
pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : vcodec_vpu_send_msg+0x4c/0x190 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
lr : vcodec_send_ap_ipi+0x78/0x170 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
sp : ffff80008750bc20
x29: ffff80008750bc20 x28: ffff1299f6d70000 x27: 0000000000000000
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
x23: ffff80008750bc98 x22: 000000000000a003 x21: ffffd45c4cfae000
x20: 0000000000000010 x19: ffff1299fd668310 x18: 000000000000001a
x17: 000000040044ffff x16: ffffd45cb15dc648 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: ffff1299c08da1c0 x13: ffffd45cb1f87a10 x12: ffffd45cb2f5fe80
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000001b30 x9 : ffffd45c4d12b488
x8 : 1fffe25339380d81 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : ffff1299c9c06c00
x5 : 0000000000000132 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000010 x1 : ffff80008750bc98 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
vcodec_vpu_send_msg+0x4c/0x190 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
vcodec_send_ap_ipi+0x78/0x170 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
vpu_dec_deinit+0x1c/0x30 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
vdec_hevc_slice_deinit+0x30/0x98 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
vdec_if_deinit+0x38/0x68 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
mtk_vcodec_dec_release+0x20/0x40 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
fops_vcodec_release+0x64/0x118 [mtk_vcodec_dec]
v4l2_release+0x7c/0x100
__fput+0x80/0x2d8
__fput_sync+0x58/0x70
__arm64_sys_close+0x40/0x90
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xf0
do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38
el0_svc+0x38/0xd8
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8
el0t_64_sync+0x1a8/0x1b0
Code: d503201f f9401660 b900127f b900227f (f9400400)
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-27). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it