In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firewire: ohci: prevent leak of left-over IRQ on unbind
Commit 5a95f1ded28691e6 ("firewire: ohci: use devres for requested IRQ")
also removed the call to free_irq() in pci_remove(), leading to a
leftover irq of devm_request_irq() at pci_disable_msi() in pci_remove()
when unbinding the driver from the device
remove_proc_entry: removing non-empty directory 'irq/136', leaking at
least 'firewire_ohci'
Call Trace:
? remove_proc_entry+0x19c/0x1c0
? __warn+0x81/0x130
? remove_proc_entry+0x19c/0x1c0
? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0
? console_unlock+0x78/0x120
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? remove_proc_entry+0x19c/0x1c0
unregister_irq_proc+0xf4/0x120
free_desc+0x3d/0xe0
? kfree+0x29f/0x2f0
irq_free_descs+0x47/0x70
msi_domain_free_locked.part.0+0x19d/0x1d0
msi_domain_free_irqs_all_locked+0x81/0xc0
pci_free_msi_irqs+0x12/0x40
pci_disable_msi+0x4c/0x60
pci_remove+0x9d/0xc0 [firewire_ohci
01b483699bebf9cb07a3d69df0aa2bee71db1b26]
pci_device_remove+0x37/0xa0
device_release_driver_internal+0x19f/0x200
unbind_store+0xa1/0xb0
remove irq with devm_free_irq() before pci_disable_msi()
also remove it in fail_msi: of pci_probe() as this would lead to
an identical leak
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it