NewPipe is an Android app for video streaming written in Java. It supports exporting and importing backups, as a way to let users move their data to a new device effortlessly. However, in versions 0.13.4 through 0.26.1, importing a backup file from an untrusted source could have resulted in Arbitrary Code Execution. This is because backups are serialized/deserialized using Java's Object Serialization Stream Protocol, which can allow constructing any class in the app, unless properly restricted.
To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker would need to build a backup file containing the exploit, and then persuade a user into importing it. During the import process, the malicious code would be executed, possibly crashing the app, stealing user data from the NewPipe app, performing nasty actions through Android APIs, and attempting Android JVM/Sandbox escapes through vulnerabilities in the Android OS.
The attack can take place only if the user imports a malicious backup file, so an attacker would need to trick a user into importing a backup file from a source they can control. The implementation details of the malicious backup file can be independent of the attacked user or the device they are being run on, and do not require additional privileges.
All NewPipe versions from 0.13.4 to 0.26.1 are vulnerable. NewPipe version 0.27.0 fixes the issue by doing the following: Restrict the classes that can be deserialized when calling Java's Object Serialization Stream Protocol, by adding a whitelist with only innocuous data-only classes that can't lead to Arbitrary Code Execution; deprecate backups serialized with Java's Object Serialization Stream Protocol; use JSON serialization for all newly created backups (but still include an alternative file serialized with Java's Object Serialization Stream Protocol in the backup zip for backwards compatibility); show a warning to the user when attempting to import a backup where the only available serialization mode is Java's Object Serialization Stream Protocol (note that in the future this serialization mode will be removed completely).
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.5 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.NVD CVSS v3 · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-28). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it