Improper Preservation of Permissions vulnerability in Apache Airflow.This issue affects Apache Airflow from 2.8.2 through 2.8.3.
Airflow's local file task handler in Airflow incorrectly set permissions for all parent folders of log folder, in default configuration adding write access to Unix group of the folders. In the case Airflow is run with the root user (not recommended) it added group write permission to all folders up to the root of the filesystem.
If your log files are stored in the home directory, these permission changes might impact your ability to run SSH operations after your home directory becomes group-writeable.
This issue does not affect users who use or extend Airflow using Official Airflow Docker reference images ( https://hub.docker.com/r/apache/airflow/ ) - those images require to have group write permission set anyway.
You are affected only if you install Airflow using local installation / virtualenv or other Docker images, but the issue has no impact if docker containers are used as intended, i.e. where Airflow components do not share containers with other applications and users.
Also you should not be affected if your umask is 002 (group write enabled) - this is the default on many linux systems.
Recommendation for users using Airflow outside of the containers:
* if you are using root to run Airflow, change your Airflow user to use non-root
* upgrade Apache Airflow to 2.8.4 or above
* If you prefer not to upgrade, you can change the https://airflow.apache.org/docs/apache-airflow/stable/configurations-ref.html#file-task-handler-new-folder-permissions to 0o755 (original value 0o775).
* if you already ran Airflow tasks before and your default umask is 022 (group write disabled) you should stop Airflow components, check permissions of AIRFLOW_HOME/logs in all your components and all parent directories of this directory and remove group write access for all the parent directories
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.3): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.3 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.3 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 1.5% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-31). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact total (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it