GoCD is a continuous delivery server. GoCD versions from 19.4.0 to 23.5.0 (inclusive) are potentially vulnerable to a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability on the loading page displayed while GoCD is starting, via abuse of a redirect_to query parameter with inadequate validation.
Attackers could theoretically abuse the query parameter to steal session tokens or other values from the user's browser. In practice exploiting this to perform privileged actions is likely rather difficult to exploit because the target user would need to be triggered to open an attacker-crafted link in the period where the server is starting up (but not completely started), requiring chaining with a separate denial-of-service vulnerability. Additionally, GoCD server restarts invalidate earlier session tokens (i.e GoCD does not support persistent sessions), so a stolen session token would be unusable once the server has completed restart, and executed XSS would be done within a logged-out context.
The issue is fixed in GoCD 24.1.0. As a workaround, it is technically possible in earlier GoCD versions to override the loading page with an earlier version which is not vulnerable, by starting GoCD with the Java system property override as either -Dloading.page.resource.path=/loading_pages/default.loading.page.html (simpler early version of loading page without GoCD introduction) or -Dloading.page.resource.path=/does_not_exist.html (to display a simple message with no interactivity).
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (3.1): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 3.1 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 3.1 LOWCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.NVD CVSS v3 · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.4% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
The CVE record names the fixed release. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it