The Pulsar Functions Worker includes a capability that permits authenticated users to create functions where the function's implementation is referenced by a URL. The supported URL schemes include "file", "http", and "https". When a function is created using this method, the Functions Worker will retrieve the implementation from the URL provided by the user. However, this feature introduces a vulnerability that can be exploited by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to any file that the Pulsar Functions Worker process has permissions to read. This includes reading the process environment which potentially includes sensitive information, such as secrets. Furthermore, an attacker could leverage this vulnerability to use the Pulsar Functions Worker as a proxy to access the content of remote HTTP and HTTPS endpoint URLs. This could also be used to carry out denial of service attacks.
This vulnerability also applies to the Pulsar Broker when it is configured with "functionsWorkerEnabled=true".
This issue affects Apache Pulsar versions from 2.4.0 to 2.10.5, from 2.11.0 to 2.11.3, from 3.0.0 to 3.0.2, from 3.1.0 to 3.1.2, and 3.2.0.
2.10 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 2.10.6.
2.11 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 2.11.4.
3.0 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 3.0.3.
3.1 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 3.1.3.
3.2 Pulsar Function Worker users should upgrade to at least 3.2.1.
Users operating versions prior to those listed above should upgrade to the aforementioned patched versions or newer versions.
The updated versions of Pulsar Functions Worker will, by default, impose restrictions on the creation of functions using URLs. For users who rely on this functionality, the Function Worker configuration provides two configuration keys: "additionalEnabledConnectorUrlPatterns" and "additionalEnabledFunctionsUrlPatterns". These keys allow users to specify a set of URL patterns that are permitted, enabling the creation of functions using URLs that match the defined patterns. This approach ensures that the feature remains available to those who require it, while limiting the potential for unauthorized access and exploitation.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (8.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 8.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 8.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 1.9% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-31). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it