In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nilfs2: fix potential bug in end_buffer_async_write
According to a syzbot report, end_buffer_async_write(), which handles the
completion of block device writes, may detect abnormal condition of the
buffer async_write flag and cause a BUG_ON failure when using nilfs2.
Nilfs2 itself does not use end_buffer_async_write(). But, the async_write
flag is now used as a marker by commit 7f42ec394156 ("nilfs2: fix issue
with race condition of competition between segments for dirty blocks") as
a means of resolving double list insertion of dirty blocks in
nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers() and nilfs_lookup_node_buffers() and the
resulting crash.
This modification is safe as long as it is used for file data and b-tree
node blocks where the page caches are independent. However, it was
irrelevant and redundant to also introduce async_write for segment summary
and super root blocks that share buffers with the backing device. This
led to the possibility that the BUG_ON check in end_buffer_async_write
would fail as described above, if independent writebacks of the backing
device occurred in parallel.
The use of async_write for segment summary buffers has already been
removed in a previous change.
Fix this issue by removing the manipulation of the async_write flag for
the remaining super root block buffer.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it