In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/bridge: sii902x: Fix probing race issue
A null pointer dereference crash has been observed rarely on TI
platforms using sii9022 bridge:
[ 53.271356] sii902x_get_edid+0x34/0x70 [sii902x]
[ 53.276066] sii902x_bridge_get_edid+0x14/0x20 [sii902x]
[ 53.281381] drm_bridge_get_edid+0x20/0x34 [drm]
[ 53.286305] drm_bridge_connector_get_modes+0x8c/0xcc [drm_kms_helper]
[ 53.292955] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x190/0x538 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 53.300510] drm_client_modeset_probe+0x1f0/0xbd4 [drm]
[ 53.305958] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x50/0x510 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 53.313611] drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x48/0x58 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 53.320039] drm_fbdev_dma_client_hotplug+0x84/0xd4 [drm_dma_helper]
[ 53.326401] drm_client_register+0x5c/0xa0 [drm]
[ 53.331216] drm_fbdev_dma_setup+0xc8/0x13c [drm_dma_helper]
[ 53.336881] tidss_probe+0x128/0x264 [tidss]
[ 53.341174] platform_probe+0x68/0xc4
[ 53.344841] really_probe+0x188/0x3c4
[ 53.348501] __driver_probe_device+0x7c/0x16c
[ 53.352854] driver_probe_device+0x3c/0x10c
[ 53.357033] __device_attach_driver+0xbc/0x158
[ 53.361472] bus_for_each_drv+0x88/0xe8
[ 53.365303] __device_attach+0xa0/0x1b4
[ 53.369135] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 53.373314] bus_probe_device+0xb0/0xb4
[ 53.377145] deferred_probe_work_func+0xcc/0x124
[ 53.381757] process_one_work+0x1f0/0x518
[ 53.385770] worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3dc
[ 53.389519] kthread+0x11c/0x120
[ 53.392750] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
The issue here is as follows:
- tidss probes, but is deferred as sii902x is still missing.
- sii902x starts probing and enters sii902x_init().
- sii902x calls drm_bridge_add(). Now the sii902x bridge is ready from
DRM's perspective.
- sii902x calls sii902x_audio_codec_init() and
platform_device_register_data()
- The registration of the audio platform device causes probing of the
deferred devices.
- tidss probes, which eventually causes sii902x_bridge_get_edid() to be
called.
- sii902x_bridge_get_edid() tries to use the i2c to read the edid.
However, the sii902x driver has not set up the i2c part yet, leading
to the crash.
Fix this by moving the drm_bridge_add() to the end of the
sii902x_init(), which is also at the very end of sii902x_probe().
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (4.7): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 4.7 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 4.7 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it