Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.
data_import/uploader.py lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to /api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}] where {project_id} was the ID of the project and {download_id} was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, data_import/api.pylines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the Content-Type of the response was determined by the file extension, since mimetypes.guess_type guesses the Content-Type based on the file extension. Since the Content-Type was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a .html file that would execute JavaScript when visited.
Version 1.10.1 contains a patch for this issue. Other remediation strategies are also available. For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; response header when viewed on the site. The sandbox directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a same-origin policy. Alternatively, restrict the allowed file extensions that may be downloaded.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (4.7): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 4.7 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 4.7 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.6% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-31). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation public PoC (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it