In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Synchronize the IOCB count to be in order
A system hang was observed with the following call trace:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 15 PID: 86747 Comm: nvme Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.2.0+ #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6515/04F3CJ, BIOS 2.7.3 03/31/2022
RIP: 0010:__wake_up_common+0x55/0x190
Code: 41 f6 01 04 0f 85 b2 00 00 00 48 8b 43 08 4c 8d
40 e8 48 8d 43 08 48 89 04 24 48 89 c6\
49 8d 40 18 48 39 c6 0f 84 e9 00 00 00 <49> 8b 40 18 89 6c 24 14 31
ed 4c 8d 60 e8 41 8b 18 f6 c3 04 75 5d
RSP: 0018:ffffb05a82afbba0 EFLAGS: 00010082
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f9b83a00018 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8f9b83a00020 RDI: ffff8f9b83a00018
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffffffffffe8 R09: ffffb05a82afbbf8
R10: 70735f7472617473 R11: 5f30307832616c71 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f815cf4c740(0000) GS:ffff8f9eeed80000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000010633a000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0
Call Trace:
__wake_up_common_lock+0x83/0xd0
qla_nvme_ls_req+0x21b/0x2b0 [qla2xxx]
__nvme_fc_send_ls_req+0x1b5/0x350 [nvme_fc]
nvme_fc_xmt_disconnect_assoc+0xca/0x110 [nvme_fc]
nvme_fc_delete_association+0x1bf/0x220 [nvme_fc]
? nvme_remove_namespaces+0x9f/0x140 [nvme_core]
nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x5b/0xa0 [nvme_core]
nvme_sysfs_delete+0x5f/0x70 [nvme_core]
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12b/0x1c0
vfs_write+0x2a3/0x3b0
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90
? syscall_exit_work+0x103/0x130
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xd0/0x130
? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xec/0x100
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x12/0x30
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc
RIP: 0033:0x7f815cd3eb97
The IOCB counts are out of order and that would block any commands from
going out and subsequently hang the system. Synchronize the IOCB count to
be in correct order.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it