In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
octeontx2-pf: Fix the use of GFP_KERNEL in atomic context on rt
The commit 4af1b64f80fb ("octeontx2-pf: Fix lmtst ID used in aura
free") uses the get/put_cpu() to protect the usage of percpu pointer
in ->aura_freeptr() callback, but it also unnecessarily disable the
preemption for the blockable memory allocation. The commit 87b93b678e95
("octeontx2-pf: Avoid use of GFP_KERNEL in atomic context") tried to
fix these sleep inside atomic warnings. But it only fix the one for
the non-rt kernel. For the rt kernel, we still get the similar warnings
like below.
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:46
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
#0: ffff800009fc5fe8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: rtnl_lock+0x24/0x30
#1: ffff000100c276c0 (&mbox->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: otx2_init_hw_resources+0x8c/0x3a4
#2: ffffffbfef6537e0 (&cpu_rcache->lock){+.+.}-{2:2}, at: alloc_iova_fast+0x1ac/0x2ac
Preemption disabled at:
[] otx2_rq_aura_pool_init+0x14c/0x284
CPU: 20 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc3-rt1-yocto-preempt-rt #1
Hardware name: Marvell OcteonTX CN96XX board (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace.part.0+0xe8/0xf4
show_stack+0x20/0x30
dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8
dump_stack+0x18/0x34
__might_resched+0x188/0x224
rt_spin_lock+0x64/0x110
alloc_iova_fast+0x1ac/0x2ac
iommu_dma_alloc_iova+0xd4/0x110
__iommu_dma_map+0x80/0x144
iommu_dma_map_page+0xe8/0x260
dma_map_page_attrs+0xb4/0xc0
__otx2_alloc_rbuf+0x90/0x150
otx2_rq_aura_pool_init+0x1c8/0x284
otx2_init_hw_resources+0xe4/0x3a4
otx2_open+0xf0/0x610
__dev_open+0x104/0x224
__dev_change_flags+0x1e4/0x274
dev_change_flags+0x2c/0x7c
ic_open_devs+0x124/0x2f8
ip_auto_config+0x180/0x42c
do_one_initcall+0x90/0x4dc
do_basic_setup+0x10c/0x14c
kernel_init_freeable+0x10c/0x13c
kernel_init+0x2c/0x140
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Of course, we can shuffle the get/put_cpu() to only wrap the invocation
of ->aura_freeptr() as what commit 87b93b678e95 does. But there are only
two ->aura_freeptr() callbacks, otx2_aura_freeptr() and
cn10k_aura_freeptr(). There is no usage of perpcu variable in the
otx2_aura_freeptr() at all, so the get/put_cpu() seems redundant to it.
We can move the get/put_cpu() into the corresponding callback which
really has the percpu variable usage and avoid the sprinkling of
get/put_cpu() in several places.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it