In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mfd: qcom-spmi-pmic: Fix revid implementation
The Qualcomm SPMI PMIC revid implementation is broken in multiple ways.
First, it assumes that just because the sibling base device has been
registered that means that it is also bound to a driver, which may not
be the case (e.g. due to probe deferral or asynchronous probe). This
could trigger a NULL-pointer dereference when attempting to access the
driver data of the unbound device.
Second, it accesses driver data of a sibling device directly and without
any locking, which means that the driver data may be freed while it is
being accessed (e.g. on driver unbind).
Third, it leaks a struct device reference to the sibling device which is
looked up using the spmi_device_from_of() every time a function (child)
device is calling the revid function (e.g. on probe).
Fix this mess by reimplementing the revid lookup so that it is done only
at probe of the PMIC device; the base device fetches the revid info from
the hardware, while any secondary SPMI device fetches the information
from the base device and caches it so that it can be accessed safely
from its children. If the base device has not been probed yet then probe
of a secondary device is deferred.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.2): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.2 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.2 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it