In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix use-after-free in shinker's callback
The mmap read lock is used during the shrinker's callback, which means
that using alloc->vma pointer isn't safe as it can race with munmap().
As of commit dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in
munmap") the mmap lock is downgraded after the vma has been isolated.
I was able to reproduce this issue by manually adding some delays and
triggering page reclaiming through the shrinker's debug sysfs. The
following KASAN report confirms the UAF:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in zap_page_range_single+0x470/0x4b8
Read of size 8 at addr ffff356ed50e50f0 by task bash/478
CPU: 1 PID: 478 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-00055-g1c8b86a3799f-dirty #70
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
zap_page_range_single+0x470/0x4b8
binder_alloc_free_page+0x608/0xadc
__list_lru_walk_one+0x130/0x3b0
list_lru_walk_node+0xc4/0x22c
binder_shrink_scan+0x108/0x1dc
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x2b4/0x500
full_proxy_write+0xd4/0x140
vfs_write+0x1ac/0x758
ksys_write+0xf0/0x1dc
__arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c
Allocated by task 492:
kmem_cache_alloc+0x130/0x368
vm_area_alloc+0x2c/0x190
mmap_region+0x258/0x18bc
do_mmap+0x694/0xa60
vm_mmap_pgoff+0x170/0x29c
ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x290/0x3a0
__arm64_sys_mmap+0xcc/0x144
Freed by task 491:
kmem_cache_free+0x17c/0x3c8
vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0x74/0x98
rcu_core+0xa38/0x26d4
rcu_core_si+0x10/0x1c
__do_softirq+0x2fc/0xd24
Last potentially related work creation:
__call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0xba0
call_rcu+0x10/0x1c
vm_area_free+0x18/0x24
remove_vma+0xe4/0x118
do_vmi_align_munmap.isra.0+0x718/0xb5c
do_vmi_munmap+0xdc/0x1fc
__vm_munmap+0x10c/0x278
__arm64_sys_munmap+0x58/0x7c
Fix this issue by performing instead a vma_lookup() which will fail to
find the vma that was isolated before the mmap lock downgrade. Note that
this option has better performance than upgrading to a mmap write lock
which would increase contention. Plus, mmap_write_trylock() has been
recently removed anyway.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (7.8): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 7.8 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 7.8 HIGHCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-28). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it