In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_newlink()
Blamed commit added back a bug I fixed in commit 9bbd917e0bec
("vlan: fix memory leak in vlan_dev_set_egress_priority")
If a memory allocation fails in vlan_changelink() after other allocations
succeeded, we need to call vlan_dev_free_egress_priority()
to free all allocated memory because after a failed ->newlink()
we do not call any methods like ndo_uninit() or dev->priv_destructor().
In following example, if the allocation for last element 2000:2001 fails,
we need to free eight prior allocations:
ip link add link dummy0 dummy0.100 type vlan id 100 \
egress-qos-map 1:2 2:3 3:4 4:5 5:6 6:7 7:8 8:9 2000:2001
syzbot report was:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888117bd1060 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor408", pid 3759, jiffies 4294956555 (age 34.090s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
09 00 00 00 00 a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:600 [inline]
[] vlan_dev_set_egress_priority+0xed/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:193
[] vlan_changelink+0x178/0x1d0 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:128
[] vlan_newlink+0x148/0x260 net/8021q/vlan_netlink.c:185
[] rtnl_newlink_create net/core/rtnetlink.c:3363 [inline]
[] __rtnl_newlink+0xa58/0xdc0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3580
[] rtnl_newlink+0x49/0x70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3593
[] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x21c/0x5c0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6089
[] netlink_rcv_skb+0x87/0x1d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
[] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319 [inline]
[] netlink_unicast+0x397/0x4c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
[] netlink_sendmsg+0x396/0x710 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
[] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline]
[] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0x80 net/socket.c:734
[] ____sys_sendmsg+0x36c/0x390 net/socket.c:2488
[] ___sys_sendmsg+0x8b/0xd0 net/socket.c:2542
[] __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2571 [inline]
[] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2580 [inline]
[] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2578 [inline]
[] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x78/0xf0 net/socket.c:2578
[] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.3% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).CISA BOD 26-04: 14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at low or medium mission impact; Track* at high (mission-essential systems).
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (no CISA value, KEV listing or exploit code on record) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). EchelonGraph holds no SSVC assessment of this CVE from CISA: none of these inputs is from Vulnrichment. EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)14 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA's BOD 26-04 default) · Technical impact total (CISA's BOD 26-04 default). Where an input reads “CISA's BOD 26-04 default”, no one has published it for this CVE, and CISA's implementation guidance says: “If “Automatable” and “Technical Impact” information items about a CVE ID are not available and the CVE ID is not in the KEV Catalog, CISA will treat its values as “no” and “total,” respectively, until CISA or a third party provides metadata about the CVE ID. CISA will always provide the Vulnrichment data for a CVE ID listed in the KEV Catalog.” Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it