In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/a6xx: Allocate enough space for GMU registers
In commit 142639a52a01 ("drm/msm/a6xx: fix crashstate capture for
A650") we changed a6xx_get_gmu_registers() to read 3 sets of
registers. Unfortunately, we didn't change the memory allocation for
the array. That leads to a KASAN warning (this was on the chromeos-5.4
kernel, which has the problematic commit backported to it):
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430
Write of size 8 at addr ffffff80c89432b0 by task A618-worker/209
CPU: 5 PID: 209 Comm: A618-worker Tainted: G W 5.4.156-lockdep #22
Hardware name: Google Lazor Limozeen without Touchscreen (rev5 - rev8) (DT)
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x248
show_stack+0x20/0x2c
dump_stack+0x128/0x1ec
print_address_description+0x88/0x4a0
__kasan_report+0xfc/0x120
kasan_report+0x10/0x18
__asan_report_store8_noabort+0x1c/0x24
_a6xx_get_gmu_registers+0x144/0x430
a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x330/0x25d4
msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c
recover_worker+0x328/0x838
kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574
kthread+0x2dc/0x39c
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
Allocated by task 209:
__kasan_kmalloc+0xfc/0x1c4
kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x1f0/0x2a0
a6xx_gpu_state_get+0x164/0x25d4
msm_gpu_crashstate_capture+0xa0/0x84c
recover_worker+0x328/0x838
kthread_worker_fn+0x32c/0x574
kthread+0x2dc/0x39c
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (6.2): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 6.2 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 6.2 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.NVD CVSS v3 · CVSS v3.0 or v3.1
- EG Likelihood
- 0.2% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is available. Apply it within your standard update timelines.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it