EchelonGraph verdictMonitorNo release containing the referenced fix is confirmed: check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule (the SSVC decision on this page).
- •Lower severity and no public exploit yet
CISA-KEV: Not listedEPSS PROB: 0.1%CVSS: 5.5Exploit: None knownExposed services: Not assessed
A fix is referenced (a reference tagged "Patch", often a source commit), but no release containing it is confirmed — find the release that contains it; until it is applied, mitigate (WAF / firewall / segmentation).
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: cdnsp: Fix deadlock issue in cdnsp_thread_irq_handler
Patch fixes the following critical issue caused by deadlock which has been
detected during testing NCM class:
smp: csd: Detected non-responsive CSD lock (#1) on CPU#0
smp: csd: CSD lock (#1) unresponsive.
....
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x61/0x1d0
RSP: 0018:ffffbc494011cde0 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000101 RBX: ffff9ee8116b4a68 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9ee8116b4658
RBP: ffffbc494011cde0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff9ee8116b4670 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ee8116b4658
R13: ffff9ee8116b4670 R14: 0000000000000246 R15: ffff9ee8116b4658
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7bcc41a830 CR3: 000000007a612003 CR4: 00000000001706e0
Call Trace:
do_raw_spin_lock+0xc0/0xd0
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x95/0xa0
cdnsp_gadget_ep_queue.cold+0x88/0x107 [cdnsp_udc_pci]
usb_ep_queue+0x35/0x110
eth_start_xmit+0x220/0x3d0 [u_ether]
ncm_tx_timeout+0x34/0x40 [usb_f_ncm]
? ncm_free_inst+0x50/0x50 [usb_f_ncm]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0xac/0x440
hrtimer_run_softirq+0x8c/0xb0
__do_softirq+0xcf/0x428
asm_call_irq_on_stack+0x12/0x20
do_softirq_own_stack+0x61/0x70
irq_exit_rcu+0xc1/0xd0
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x52/0xb0
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
RIP: 0010:do_raw_spin_trylock+0x18/0x40
RSP: 0018:ffffbc494138bda8 EFLAGS: 00000246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9ee8116b4658 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9ee8116b4658
RBP: ffffbc494138bda8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff9ee8116b4670 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9ee8116b4658
R13: ffff9ee8116b4670 R14: ffff9ee7b5c73d80 R15: ffff9ee8116b4000
_raw_spin_lock+0x3d/0x70
? cdnsp_thread_irq_handler.cold+0x32/0x112c [cdnsp_udc_pci]
cdnsp_thread_irq_handler.cold+0x32/0x112c [cdnsp_udc_pci]
? cdnsp_remove_request+0x1f0/0x1f0 [cdnsp_udc_pci]
? cdnsp_thread_irq_handler+0x5/0xa0 [cdnsp_udc_pci]
? irq_thread+0xa0/0x1c0
irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x60
irq_thread+0x105/0x1c0
? __kthread_parkme+0x42/0x90
? irq_forced_thread_fn+0x90/0x90
? wake_threads_waitq+0x30/0x30
? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0
kthread+0x12a/0x160
? kthread_park+0x90/0x90
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
The root cause of issue is spin_lock/spin_unlock instruction instead
spin_lock_irqsave/spin_lock_irqrestore in cdnsp_thread_irq_handler
function.
What the EG score is made of (scorer v4.0: the three questions the 0–10 score mixes, published apart · methodology)
The EG score (5.5): severity, escalated by confirmed exploitation. This CVE's 5.5 is its impact severity (EG Severity), not escalated.
- EG Severity
- 5.5 MEDIUMCVSS-B, impact only: no KEV listing, EPSS or EG-KEV tier raises it.GitHub Security Advisory CVSS
- EG Likelihood
- 0.1% within 30 daysSource: FIRST EPSS (model v2026.06.15, score date 2026-10-25). FIRST's exploitation probability, not an EchelonGraph model.
- Confirmed exploitation
- None on record (CISA KEV, EG-KEV Tier 1)Reported apart from the likelihood: an observed fact, not a probability.
- EG Priority
- SSVC Track at medium mission impactTrack at every mission impact level.CISA BOD 26-04: 60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.Each input and its source, and whom BOD 26-04 binds: the SSVC and BOD 26-04 blocks below.
SSVC (CISA's decision table, applied by EchelonGraph)Track at every mission impact level.
A fix is referenced, but no release containing it is confirmed. Check the referenced fix and the vendor's advisory for a release that contains it; until one is applied, restrict network exposure of the affected system or apply the vendor's mitigation on your normal schedule.
Exploitation none (CISA Vulnrichment) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). All three are CISA's SSVC values (Vulnrichment). EchelonGraph applied CISA's decision table to them; CISA publishes SSVC inputs and the table, not a decision for each CVE. Mission impact is CISA's Mission & Well-being decision point, and only you can judge it. CISA's table makes it high when Mission Prevalence is Essential — the vulnerable component "directly provides capabilities that constitute at least one MEF for at least one entity" (MEF: mission essential function) — or when Public Well-Being Impact is Irreversible: "multiple fatalities are likely", the cyber-physical system "is likely lost or destroyed", "extreme or serious externalities" are imposed on other parties, or social systems such as elections or the financial grid "are destabilized and potentially collapse". CISA's decision table
BOD 26-04 (CISA's remediation timeline, Table 1)60 days if the affected system is publicly exposed; Fix on system upgrade if it is not.
No released fix is confirmed on this page, but CISA's timeline does not wait for a fix's release: it starts when an agency identifies the flaw on an asset and updates the CDM Agency and Federal Dashboard, and the directive counts patching, decommissioning the system or another action as remediation. Until a fixed release is applied, mitigate as this page's verdict says. In the directive's words, “Fix on system upgrade” means that, “unless conditions change”, the vulnerability “should be remediated the next time the vulnerable asset receives a scheduled major upgrade or rebuild”: its timelines are “dynamic as facts change”, and a KEV listing shortens them.
The score's inputs: In CISA KEV no (CISA's KEV catalog) · Automatable no (CISA Vulnrichment) · Technical impact partial (CISA Vulnrichment). Whether your system is publicly exposed is yours to answer. BOD 26-04 binds US Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies; for anyone else it is CISA's published timeline, a reference rather than an obligation. The directive · how EchelonGraph applies it